Michael Imran Kanu
Abstract
The Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill 2025, the fruit of a review process reaching back to the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, carries significant reforms, among them a strengthened and renamed National Electoral Commission with higher qualifications for commissioners, and a constitutional quota for the nomination of women as well as greater political participation by dual citizens. Its passage on 10 August 2026 was overshadowed by a contestation, which may soon be before the Supreme Court, over the majority that section 108(2)(b) requires for constitutional alteration: whether two-thirds of the entire membership of Parliament, or two-thirds of the Members present and voting; the voting method used; and whether the special majority governs the committee stage or only the second and third readings. This article states both constructions as fairly as it can, addresses the quorum question each raises, identifies the points on which they truly join issue, and commends the matter to the Supreme Court, whose authoritative clarity would place the gains of the reform on secure constitutional footing.
Keywords: 1991 Constitution, constitutional amendment; special majority; two-thirds; entire membership; members present and voting; Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.
- Introduction
The Constitution of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Bill 2025 is the culmination of a constitutional review pursued, across successive administrations, for more than two decades, a process first called for by the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, carried forward by the Peter Tucker Commission and the Justice Edmond Cowan Constitutional Review Committee, and refined by the Tripartite Committee that followed the 2023 elections.[1] The reforms it carries are substantial. They include the renaming and strengthening of the Electoral Commission as the National Electoral Commission, higher qualifications for its members; and the constitutional entrenchment of a quota for the nomination of women, alongside measures directed at the inclusion of dual citizens, young people and minority voices.[2] Whatever view is taken of its more contested provisions, the Bill represents a serious effort to move, in the words of the Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, from a constitution of survival to one of prosperity, to which one may add, constitutional democratic consolidation.
That achievement is now clouded by a question of procedure. When the Bill was passed on 10 August 2026, the Opposition caucus withdrew from the Chamber in protest at the majority said to be required for constitutional alteration,[3] and the Speaker after his ruling invited the Supreme Court to proffer an opinion on the issue of threshold.[4] The Court’s original jurisdiction extends to the interpretation of the Constitution,[5] and it is the proper and final arbiter of the point. This article does not seek to pre-empt that determination. Its aim is to set out, as fairly as it can, the two constructions of section 108(2)(b) that are in contention, together with the subsidiary questions of the committee stage and the quorum, as well as the voting method, so that the issues joined before the Court are clearly framed.
Section 108(2)(b) requires that a Bill to alter the Constitution be supported, on its second and third readings, by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.[6] The dispute is whether that fraction is taken of the entire membership of the House or of the Members present and voting; and whether the special majority attaches to the committee stage as well as to the two readings. Part II sets out the provisions. Parts III and IV state, in turn, the case for each construction. Part V addresses the committee stage and Part VI the quorum. Part VII discusses the voting method. Part VIII identifies the points on which the constructions truly join issue. Part IX considers the finality of the Speaker’s ruling and the wisdom of the reference. Part X turns to the role of the Supreme Court, and Part XI concludes.
- The Provisions in Issue
In the Constitution of Sierra Leone Act. No. 6 of 1991, section 108(2)(b) fixes the special threshold, and the support needed, on the second and third readings, by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament. Section 91(1) supplies the ordinary rule of decision that, except as otherwise provided in the Constitution, a question is determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.[7] Section 89 provides a quorum of one-fourth of all the Members, operative on objection taken.[8] And, for the entrenched provisions, section 108(3) and (4) requires in addition approval at a referendum.[9] The special elements section 108 introduces are thus the proportion, the two nominated readings, publication in the Gazette, and for entrenched provisions a referendum. The question is whether it also, and silently, alters the voting base of section 91(1), that is, Members present and voting.
III. The First Construction: Two-Thirds of the Entire Membership
On the first construction, which is the principal argument of the Opposition caucus, the two-thirds is a proportion of the entire membership of Parliament. Its textual foundation is that section 91(1) governs only “except as otherwise provided,” and that section 108 is such a provision otherwise made. Where the ordinary rule was intended, the argument runs, the framers wrote “Members present and voting”. In section 108 they wrote “Members of Parliament,” a defined class of fixed size, and the change of language should carry a change of meaning.[10] A fraction “of the Members of Parliament” is, on this view, a fraction of that whole body, not of the smaller number who happen to be present when a division is called.
The purposive case is that a special amendment procedure exists precisely to place the Constitution beyond the reach of a transient majority, and to require a broad and durable consensus before the fundamental law is changed. A threshold measured only against those present and voting, it is said, would make constitutional change turn on attendance and timing, and would reward the emptying of the Chamber. An opposition that withdrew or is kicked out would shrink the denominator and make alteration easier, not harder.[11] On the entire-membership reading, by contrast, a walkout is arithmetically futile, because the proponents must still gather or need two-thirds of the whole House. This must have been part of the calculus of the Opposition caucus, in deciding to walkout while relying on the “two-thirds” threshold based on the whole.
This first construction may draw from similar Commonwealth manner-and-form authorities, which treat a prescribed special majority as a mandatory condition of valid law-making. In Bribery Commissioner v Ranasinghe the Privy Council held void a statute not passed by the special majority its constituent instrument required.[12] Attorney-General for New South Wales v Trethowan[13] and Harris v Minister of the Interior[14] are to like effect. The jurists are said to point the same way, for instance, Dicey on the rigidity of a controlled constitution, Jennings and Wade on the binding force of manner and form, and Nwabueze on the entrenched special majority as a protective device in African constitutions, so that the safeguard should be construed strictly, against dilution.[15]
- The Second Construction: Two-Thirds of Those Present and Voting
On the second construction, which reflected the ruling of the Speaker and supported by the ruling Majority caucus, the two-thirds is a proportion of the Members present and voting, a quorum being present. Its textual foundation is the phrase “by the votes of … the Members of Parliament”, the unit of account is the vote, and a Member absent or abstaining casts none. Section 91(1) supplies the base, the votes of the Members present and voting, and section 108, on this view, otherwise provides only as to the proportion and the stages, not as to the base, which therefore carries through.
The central idea of the second construction is that, where the framers intended a proportion of the whole House, they said so, in the 1991 Constitution and across the Commonwealth, and did not do so in section 108(2)(b). Section 51(5) requires “two-thirds of all the Members of Parliament” for a resolution against the President; and section 108(4) requires “one-half of all such persons” at a referendum. Twice the framers wrote “all,” and in section 108(2)(b) they did not.[16]
The Constitutions of Sri Lanka (“the whole number of Members, including those not present”), South Africa (“the total number of members of both Houses”) and India (“a majority of the total membership … and … two-thirds of the members present and voting”) each spell out the whole-House base in express and distinctive words that section 108(2)(b) does not contain.[17] This reading also gives the word “all” in section 51(5) work to do. On the opposing view, it would be surplusage, whereas here it is the very word that converts the ordinary base into a base of total membership.[18]
The textual distinction between Sierra Leone and a number of comparable African constitutions is significant. Section 108(2)(b) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 provides that a constitutional amendment Bill must, at its second and third readings, be supported by “the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament”, but notably does not qualify “Members of Parliament” with the word “all”.[19] By contrast, for example, the constitutions of Kenya, Ghana, Uganda and Nigeria expressly employ the formulation “all the members” when prescribing the parliamentary majority necessary for constitutional amendment. Kenya requires “not less than two-thirds of all the members” of each House; Ghana requires “at least two-thirds of all the members of Parliament”; Uganda requires “not less than two-thirds of all members of Parliament”; and Nigeria similarly requires “not less than two-thirds majority of all the members” of each House.[20]
The inclusion of “all” in these constitutions is consequential because it expressly fixes the denominator by reference to the entire membership of the legislature and thereby excludes an interpretation based only on those members present and voting. Nigeria goes further by expressly providing that the prescribed membership remains the denominator “notwithstanding any vacancy”.[21] Sierra Leone’s omission of the word “all” therefore leaves greater room for interpretation, particularly when section 108(2)(b) is read alongside section 91(1), which expressly establishes “Members present and voting” as the ordinary rule for parliamentary decisions. While a purposive reading may support treating section 108(2)(b) as a special supermajority requirement distinct from the ordinary rule in section 91(1), the comparative African provisions demonstrate that where constitution-makers intend unequivocally to require two-thirds of the entire membership, they have commonly said so expressly by using the word “all”.[22]
This second construction has direct judicial support, which may be persuasive in Sierra Leone. In the National Prohibition Cases the Supreme Court of the United States held that a requirement of a two-thirds vote of each House to propose a constitutional amendment means two-thirds of the Members present, a quorum being present, and not of the entire membership.[23] It reads in the manner-and-form as authority for fidelity to text. In Ranasinghe and Harris the courts enforced special majorities computed, in terms, on the “whole number” or “total number” of members, and the same discipline requires the court to enforce what section 108(2)(b) says and not to supply the words the framers omitted. On this view, a question in a deliberative assembly is decided by those who vote, unless the instrument fixes the total, to which it did not.[24]
The purposive case for the second construction is that an entire-membership rule would hand any sufficiently large minority an absolute veto over reform, exercisable by absence rather than by vote, and would make even a non-entrenched change hostage to a boycott. Its answer to the entrenchment concern is that the Constitution is protected in layers, through publication, a supermajority of those voting at two readings, and, for the entrenched provisions, a referendum requiring one-half of all registered voters and two-thirds of the votes cast, and that it is at the referendum, where the people have the last word. Indeed, that is where the framers placed the demanding language of “all”.[25]
- The Committee Stage
A second and related question is whether the special majority governs the committee stage. Section 108(2)(b) attaches the requirement to “the second and third readings.” At the committee stage, the ordinary rule of simple majority should govern clause-by-clause consideration. To require two-thirds at every committee division is to add a requirement the text does not contain. The Standing Orders proceed on that footing.[26]
The contrary view was advanced. However, the safeguard should attach to the substance of constitutional alteration, as the substance is protected regardless, because no Bill can pass without the special majority at the two readings and, for entrenched provisions, a referendum. Refinement in committee alters nothing until passage, and passage is where the supermajority bites. The two positions turn on whether the naming of the readings confines the requirement, or merely illustrates where a pervasive safeguard must at least be observed.
- The Quorum Question
The quorum matters only on the second construction. If the two-thirds is of the entire membership, the difficulty does not arise. Two-thirds of the whole House cannot vote in favour unless at least two-thirds are present, so the threshold subsumes any quorum. If the two-thirds is of those present and voting, however, it must be read with section 89, which sets a quorum of one-fourth of all the Members and, by its terms, bites only on an objection taken.[27]
The second construction answers that the safeguard lies in the quorum, not in the denominator. The controlling authority couples the two, requiring two-thirds of those present, a quorum being present;[28] a court adopting the present-and-voting base may insist that the quorum genuinely be satisfied for a constitutional vote, and Parliament may fortify it by its Standing Order, while the referendum stands behind every entrenched provision.
VII. The Voting Method
A further question concerns not the size of the special majority but the manner in which it was taken. The two-thirds was ascertained by a collection of voices, following a rollcall of the Members present in the Chamber. In his ruling the Speaker reasoned that, the Constitution and the Standing Orders prescribing no special method for a vote to alter the Constitution, the general rule in section 91 governs. Save where the Constitution otherwise provides, a question before Parliament is determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.[29]
The ordinary mode of ascertaining it is the collection of voices, on which the presiding officer puts the question and declares whether the ayes or the nays have it. A division, a counted vote, follows only where that opinion is challenged or a division is claimed.[30] Owing to the walkout, there was no nay, and no call for division or counted vote. So understood, the rollcall fixed the Members present, and the collection of voices ascertained that two-thirds of the ayes. By this method, was the threshold shown to have been met on this occasion?
The Speaker fortified the point with precedent. The collection of voices, he observed, was the method by which Parliament amended section 79 of the Constitution, the provision governing the election of the Speaker, in 2012, when the party now in opposition was itself the governing majority.[31] In his ruling, the Speaker noted that the practice is not isolated; constitutional amendments have before now been carried in Parliament by a collection of voices, a quorum being present and no division being claimed. Indeed, Parliament has taken constitutional questions by voices before, and did so when those who now object stood to gain.
Outside of a walkout, a respectable unease would remain, and it should be stated. A collection of voices records the presiding officer’s assessment of the sense of the House; it does not yield a tally of each Member’s vote. A special majority of two-thirds is, by contrast, a numerical threshold, and its satisfaction is on its face more surely shown by a recorded division that counts the votes than by acclamation, the more so where the very question in issue is how many voted in favour and out of what base. It is to be noted that the collection of voices method adopted sits easily with the second construction, on which the base is those present, fixed by the rollcall, and the proportion is taken among them. It sits less easily with the first, on which two-thirds of the entire membership must be demonstrated, a matter a collection of voices among those present cannot readily establish. The walkout denied this ever being tested.
The answer offered is that section 91 and the Standing Orders commit the manner of voting to the House, that a division lay available to any Member who doubted the result and was not insisted upon, and that the practice of Parliament supports what was done. The question of method is thus bound up with, yet distinct from, the question of meaning. It goes to whether the threshold was shown to be met, not to what the threshold is. That distinction is itself a reason for authoritative resolution, and a further matter which the Court, once seised of the manner of this Bill’s passage, may be asked to address.
VIII. Where the Constructions Join Issue
Reduced to essentials, the constructions meet on four points. The first is the word “all.” Both sides invoke the presumption that a change of language signals a change of meaning. The first construction reads the shift from “present and voting” to “Members of Parliament” as a move to the whole House. Meanwhile, the second reads the omission of the “all” used in sections 51(5) and 108(4) as a decision not to require the whole House. The canon is common ground, but its direction is contested.
The second is the manner-and-form line. Both constructions may claim Ranasinghe and Harris. For the first, those cases establish that special majorities are strictly enforced safeguards. For the second, they show that the whole-House base was achieved by express words, “whole number,” “total number”, absent from section 108(2)(b), so that fidelity to text tells the other way. The decided cases prescribed that the condition binds, but they do not, of themselves, decide what section 108(2)(b) prescribes.
The third is the walkout. The first construction says a present-and-voting rule rewards the emptying of the Chamber and lets a minority ease amendment by departing. The second says an entire-membership rule rewards absence in the opposite direction, handing a minority a veto it need not cast a vote to exercise. Each reading disciplines one form of strategic behaviour and tolerates another.
The fourth is the quorum, already discussed, whether the framers’ safeguard resides in a total-membership denominator or in a quorum requirement read together with a supermajority of those voting. On each of these points there is a respectable argument both ways, which is why the question is a proper one for authoritative resolution rather than continued contest.
- The Finality of the Speaker’s Ruling and the Reference to the Supreme Court
It might be said that the Speaker, as master of the procedure of the House, could have settled the matter by a ruling from the Speaker’s Chair, and there is force in the premise. Parliament is empowered to regulate its own procedure and to make Standing Orders for the orderly conduct of its proceedings,[32] and a long tradition treats the internal proceedings of the legislature as the exclusive cognisance of the House, into which the courts will not inquire. The principle is as old as article 9 of the Bill of Rights in England, that proceedings in Parliament ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court.[33] It was applied in Bradlaugh v Gossett, where the court declined to examine their Parliament’s handling of its own internal affairs, and reaffirmed in British Railways Board v Pickin, where the House of Lords held that the courts may not inquire whether Parliament had observed its own procedures in passing a law.[34] On a point of order, the ruling of the Speaker is, within the House, and final.[35]
That immunity, however, is bounded, and the boundary is decisive here. The authorities protect the application by Parliament of its own subordinate rules. They were fashioned in a system of parliamentary sovereignty, and they do not govern a written constitution that is supreme and that commits its own interpretation to a particular court. Section 124(1)(a) of the 1991 Constitution places its interpretation within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, to the exclusion of all other courts, and section 94(1) makes the power to regulate procedure subject in terms to the provisions of the Constitution.[36]
The contest over section 108(2)(b) is not a dispute about the meaning of a Standing Order, which the Speaker may resolve. It is a dispute about the meaning of the fundamental law, the grundnorm, which the Speaker may not. The manner-and-form authorities discussed above make the same point from the other direction. In Ranasinghe the Privy Council looked behind the Speaker’s certificate to determine whether the special majority the Constitution required had in truth been obtained, and held that neither the certificate nor the ordinary parliamentary record could foreclose that inquiry.[37] A ruling from the Chair, whatever its authority in the Chamber, could not be the last word on a question the Constitution reserves to the Court.
Seen in this light, the Speaker’s decision to invite the Supreme Court for an interpretation after his ruling appears not merely permissible but wise. He might have allowed his ruling to stand without more, and leave it to the Opposition to impugn the Bill after its passage, in an action for its invalidity. This course would shadowed the reform with uncertainty for as long as any challenge endured, and would stake the gains of a generation’s labour on the hazards of subsequent litigation.
The Speaker chose instead to commit the question, at the threshold, to the single institution competent to answer it with binding authority.[38] That choice honours the separation of powers, spares the Constitution a contest settled by numbers in the Chamber or by attrition in the courts, and offers the reforms the security of an answer given by law. Whatever view may be taken of any provisional ruling from the Speaker, the decisive step, the placing of the constitutional question before the Supreme Court, was the right one; and the propriety of the reference does not depend upon the correctness of anything said before it was made.
- The Question for the Supreme Court
The Constitution provides its own means of settling the matter. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction, to the exclusion of all other courts, in all matters relating to the interpretation of the Constitution,[39] and the Speaker’s reference invokes exactly that function. A determination by the Court would do more than resolve the present controversy. It would fix, prospectively and for all future amendments, the meaning of the most important procedural safeguard in the Constitution and would do so with an authority that neither a parliamentary majority nor an opposition can supply for itself.
There is a national interest in that clarity. The reforms the Bill carries, a more independent electoral commission, a constitutional place for the representation of women, dual citizens political inclusion, all fruits of a reform process two decades in the making, deserve to rest on a foundation that cannot later be impugned for want of the required majority. A procedural doubt left unresolved would shadow those gains and invite challenge. An authoritative ruling, whichever construction it adopts, would secure them, or would identify with precision what remains to be done. The point is not which side prevails, but that the rule be known, stable, and settled by law rather than by attrition.
- Conclusion
The strength of a constitutional order lies not in the absence of hard questions but in its capacity to resolve them through law. Section 108(2)(b) has produced such a question, and it is a genuinely balanced one. The text, structure, comparative learning and authority can each be marshalled on either side. It is fitting that it be answered not by the louder voice in the Chamber or on social media, but by the Court to which the Constitution entrusts its interpretation. For the sake of Sierra Leone, and of the reforms that a generation of its citizens has worked to achieve, one may hope that the Supreme Court, as the final arbiter, will provide the clarity the moment requires, and that the gains of this constitutional amendment will be placed, once and for all, on secure and unquestioned constitutional footing.
Annex
The Provisions in Issue
Reproduced from the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No 6 of 1991)
Section 89 — Quorum in Parliament
If objection is taken by any Member of Parliament that there are present in Parliament (besides the person presiding) less than one-fourth of all the Members of Parliament, and the person presiding is so satisfied, he shall thereupon adjourn Parliament.
Section 91 — Voting in Parliament
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, any question proposed for decision in Parliament shall be determined by a majority of the votes of the Members present and voting.
(2) The person presiding in Parliament may cast a vote whenever necessary to avoid an equality of votes but shall not vote in any other case.
Section 108(2) — Alteration of Constitution (conditions)
(a) before the first reading of the Bill in Parliament the text of the Bill is published in at least two issues of the Gazette: Provided that not less than nine days shall elapse between the first publication of the Bill in the Gazette and the second publication; and
(b) the Bill is supported on the second and third readings by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the Members of Parliament.
Section 108(4) — Referendum (extract)
… the Bill shall not be regarded as having been approved at the referendum unless it was so approved by the votes of not less than one-half of all such persons and by not less than two-thirds of all the votes validly cast at the referendum …
Section 51(5) — Removal of the President (extract)
… Parliament may, in secret session, on a motion supported by not less than two-thirds of all the Members of Parliament, resolve that the President has been guilty of such violation of the Constitution or … such gross misconduct as is incompatible with his continuance in office as President …
Endnotes
* Michael Imran Kanu holds a Doctor of Juridical Science (SJD) degree and serves as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations in New York. He is also a Senior Visiting Fellow, London School of Economics (Faculty of Law). The views expressed in this article are personal.
[1] “Minister of Justice Presents Constitutional Amendment Bill as Historic Democratic Renewal.” Sierra Leone Press [Freetown], 2026; “Parliament Passes Constitutional Amendment Bill 2025 Amidst Opposition Walkout.” Sierraloaded [Freetown], 11 Aug. 2026.
[2] On the National Electoral Commission, the Search and Nomination Committee, and the qualification of commissioners, “A Closer Look at the 2025 Constitutional Amendment Bill.” nationalistsl.com, 13 Jan. 2026; on the quota for the nomination of women, “Minister of Justice Presents Constitutional Amendment Bill.”
[3] Marius Musa Kargbo, “Parliament Okays Constitutional Amendment Bill … Speaker Calls for Supreme Court Clarification.” AYV News [Freetown], 11 Aug. 2026.
[4] “Sierra Leone’s Constitutional Faultline: A Walkout, a Two-Thirds Dispute and the Stakes for 2028.” Sierra Leone Telegraph [Freetown], Aug. 2026, reporting the position of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker.
[5] Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991), sec. 124(1)(a).
[6] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 108(2)(b).
[7] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 91(1).
[8] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 89.
[9] Constitution of Sierra Leone, secs. 108(3) and (4).
[10] See Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation, 8th ed., LexisNexis, 2020; Rupert Cross, John Bell, and George Engle, Cross: Statutory Interpretation, 3rd ed., Butterworths, 1995.
[11] Kargbo, “Parliament Okays Constitutional Amendment Bill.”
[12] Bribery Commissioner v. Ranasinghe, [1965] AC 172 (PC).
[13] Attorney-General for New South Wales v. Trethowan, [1932] AC 526 (PC), affirming (1931) 44 CLR 394 (HCA).
[14] Harris v. Minister of the Interior, 1952 (2) SA 428 (A).
[15] For the flexible/rigid distinction, James Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, vol. 1, Clarendon Press, 1901; A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, edited by E. C. S. Wade, 10th ed., Macmillan, 1959; Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 5th ed., University of London Press, 1959; H. W. R. Wade, “The Basis of Legal Sovereignty.” Cambridge Law Journal, vol. 13, 1955, p. 172; B. O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, C. Hurst, 1973.
[16] Constitution of Sierra Leone, secs. 51(5), 108(4).
[17] Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka (1978), art. 82(5) (and, historically, Ceylon (Constitution) Order in Council 1946, sec. 29(4)); South Africa Act 1909, sec. 152; Constitution of India (1950), art. 368.
[18] Bennion, Bailey and Norbury on Statutory Interpretation (presumption against surplusage).
[19] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 108(2)(b).
[20] Constitution of Kenya (2010), art. 256(1)(d); Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (1992), art. 291(3); Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995), art. 262; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (1999), sec. 9(2).
[21] Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, sec. 9(4).
[22] Constitution of Sierra Leone, secs. 91(1), 108(2)(b); Constitution of Kenya, art. 256(1)(d); Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, art. 291(3); Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, art. 262; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, sec. 9(2).
[23] National Prohibition Cases (Rhode Island v. Palmer), 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
[24] Erskine May: Parliamentary Practice, 25th ed., LexisNexis, 2019.
[25] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 108(4).
[26] Standing Orders of the Parliament of Sierra Leone, SO 44; “Sierra Leone’s Constitutional Faultline.”
[27] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 89.
[28] National Prohibition Cases.
[29] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 91(1); Kargbo, “Parliament Okays Constitutional Amendment Bill.”
[30] Standing Orders of the Parliament of Sierra Leone, SO 45.
[31] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 79 (election of the Speaker); and see Kargbo, “Parliament Okays Constitutional Amendment Bill,” reporting the Speaker’s ruling.
[32] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 94(1).
[33] Bill of Rights 1689, art. 9.
[34] Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) 12 QBD 271 (DC); British Railways Board v. Pickin, [1974] AC 765 (HL).
[35] Erskine May.
[36] Constitution of Sierra Leone, secs. 94(1), 124(1)(a).
[37] Ranasinghe; Harris. Compare Raja Ram Pal v. Hon’ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184 (Supreme Court of India), holding that the immunity of internal proceedings does not extend to their substantive unconstitutionality or illegality.
[38] “Sierra Leone’s Constitutional Faultline”; Kargbo, “Parliament Okays Constitutional Amendment Bill.”
[39] Constitution of Sierra Leone, sec. 124(1)(a).
